From Bin Laden to Facebook - 10 days of abduction and 10 years of terrorism (Maria A. Ressa) (2024)

Hostage Taking Terrorism: 2 Gazes

Kidnapping in the Southern Philippines

Kidnappings as a terrorist instrument of AQIM and the MUJAO

PEACE & SECURITY-PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ INTERNATIONALES (EuroMediterranean Journal of International Law and International Relations), 2013

This article updates to the Spring of 2013 the kidnappings implemented by a number of Salafist-Jihadist groups acting in the Maghreb, the Sahel, and Nigeria, providing analysis. Since then, a number of hostages have been released and other foreigners have been kidnapped, but the key-issues defining the terrorist groups’ strategies remain. The threat is always there, and their most negative consequences (payment of ransoms and release of Jihadist-Salafist prisoners, among others) do remain as well. LES ENLEVEMENTS, UN INSTRUMENT TERRORISTE DE L’ AQMI ET DU MUJAO Cet article met au jour dans le printemps 2013 et analyse les enlevements des hotages par les groupes Jihadistes-Salafistes actifs au Maghreb, au Sahel et dans le Nigéria. Suite à çe moment, quelques hotages ont été liberés et des autres kidnappés, mais les clefs pour definer les strategies des groups terroristes restent les memes. La menace reste toujours là, et ses consequences les plus negatives (parmis des autres, le virement des rançons et la liberation des prisonniers Jihadistes) restent aussi. LOS SECUESTROS COMO INSTRUMENTO TERRORISTA DE AQMI Y DEL MUYAO Este artículo analiza el estado de la cuestión en la primavera de 2013 de los secuestros realizados por grupos yihadistas salafistas en el Magreb, el Sahel y Nigeria. Desde entonces algunos rehenes han sido liberados y otros secuestrados, pero los elementos claves relacionados con la estrategia de los grupos terroristas siguen siendo los mismos. La amenaza perdura en esta dimensión, y las lacras que produce –en forma de pagos de rescates o de liberación de yihadistas presos, entre otras– también.

Kidnapping and the limits of acceptance

For many humanitarian agencies, acceptance—gaining the trust and protection of local communities—is the preferred security management tool for reasons of perception, ease of access and cost (both real and opportunity costs). Humanitarian agencies have long been uncomfortable with the contradiction of using deterrence mechanisms in humanitarian operations, although the increased use of armed guards has been a noticeable trend over the last decade or so. Protection—'bunkerisation'—has also become the norm in many highly insecure contexts, with similar contradictions and feelings of discomfort associated with this strategy. But in hyper-insecure contexts, is acceptance a viable option? This paper argues that in some contexts, the acceptance strategy no longer works. The primary cause of this is the increasing severity of the kidnapping risk which has overwhelmed the usefulness of 'normal', non-deterrence and non-protection-oriented security measures such as acceptance. The dangers of relying on deterrence measures for humanitarian organisations in such sensitive contexts will be reviewed. As a case study, the experience of one particular humanitarian organisation working in northern Nigeria and Syria in the 2012–2014 period is elaborated upon. A 'zone of exception' framework is proposed based on the work of Carl Schmitt. Issues for future reflection by organisations working in such contexts are introduced.

ASG Philippine Kidnap for Ransom

ASG Group Profile, 2021

This paper provides a contemporary profile of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), an Islamic separatist organisation based in the southern Philippines. It argues that ASG has become a transnational organised crime group driven by financial motivations and thus shifted away from its founding Islamic extremist ideological and separatist political objectives. This shift can be explained by a change in organisational and leadership structure in the post-September 11 security environment. ASG has moved away from prioritising acts of Islamic motivated violence and adopted traditional organised criminal activities, such as drug trafficking and kidnapping, to achieve its short term aims of survival in an increasingly contested security domain.

Kidnapping in The North West Frontier Province (NWFP)

Pakistan Journal of …, 2010

Global trends in kidnapping by terrorist groups

Fighting Insurgents--No Shortcuts to Success

2004

Of targets and ransoms: a look at hostages and non-ransom policies in terrorist attacks.

The notion of not paying ransoms to release hostages taken by terrorist groups is one that is deeply ingrained within the terrorist discourse, without being properly explained or conceptualized even. It stems from traditionalised counter-terrorist policies that have no theoretical understanding of the basic set of ideas tied to behaviour during negotiations, on the part of the offender and on the part of the defender. Notions like empathy, understanding and patience are seen as steps towards reconciliation, as opposed to techniques of manipulation that can be used to undermine the action of terrorist groups (Dolnik and Fitzgerald, 2011). This discourse has emerged again, following the decidedly sudden appearance and unpredictably rapid expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (heretofore referred to as ISIS) - the extension of what has come to be known as their caliphate, has implicated previously relatively peaceful areas of Northern Africa, interfering with the work of local development Non-Governmental Organisations. ISIS has started preying on aid workers, tourists and journalists as well, and the difference in ransom policies has become marked again between the US and UK and some European states like Italy, France and Germany. In spite of the well-known policies put forth by states that traditionally do not pay ransoms, the influx of US and UK travellers in the areas at risk has not stopped. On the contrary, when juxtaposed with the behaviour of mainland European states in a multiple hostage scenario, the divergence in rescue or ransom tactics is amplified. The fact that this marked difference in tactics (or lack of thereof) has resurfaced, provokes a discussion about the motivations behind the kidnappings of nationals for whom their states will not pay. At the same time, we need to analyse whether the work of local NGOs has somehow exacerbated the situation, by essentially providing active terrorist groups with a ‘hostage pool’. What this short essay will attempt to observe is the main practice in ransom policies, its ultimate usefulness and the interaction of NGOs with terrorist groups with the circumstances that are subsequently created. Ultimately, the above questions regard the principle of non-negotiation and if it is really as functional as policymakers think it to be. For the purpose of this essay negotiation will be defined as engagement in political discourse and as a practical procedure of bargaining between two opposing parties.

THE COLOMBIAN HOSTAGE TAKING CASE; A PERMITTED PERFIDY